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DISCRIMINATION LAW-STANDARDIZED TESTING IN E.M.H.
PLACEMENT: WHAT STANDARD Is STANDARD? PASE v. Hannon, 3

EHLR 552:108 (1980).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Standardized tests have become familiar to American youth,
and much of a young person's future is predicated upon scores
achieved on these examinations. Standardized tests may be admin
istered by public or private schools,l professional organizations, 2
testing centers, 3 or personnel offices. 4 Examination scores fre
quently determine the extent and type of educational opportunities
an individual will have, the type of job he is qualified to perform,
or the salary he may receive. Until recently, most Americans have
allowed these test scores to determine the course of their lives. 5
In Parents in Action on Special Education v. Hannon 6 (PASE)
the use of three standardized tests was challenged when the test
results were used to establish school placement classifications for
children. Parents in Action on Special Education (PASE) brought
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, claiming that the use of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for
Children (WISe),7 the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children
1. Wechsler Scales, Stanford-Binet, and other IQ, ability, or achievement tests
are administered by public or private schools.
2. Passing scores on bar examinations, teacher certification examinations, and
other competency tests are required for membership within various professions.
3. The Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), Law.School Admission Test (LSAT),
and Graduate Record Exam (GRE) are examples of tests administered by the Educa
tional Testing Service of Princeton, New Jersey, one center for standardized test de
velopment and evaluation.
4. Wechsler Scales, Miller Analogy Test, and various other interest inventories
and aptitude tests occasionally are administered by personnel offices prior to place
ment of employees into particular jobs.
5. Such scores undoubtedly continue to affect those who take standardized
tests. Recently, the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & West Cum.
Supp. 1981), has provided avenues through which test takers may challenge the use
of test scores that determine their future. Although not perfect solutions to the prob
lems generated by testing programs, such laws encourage a more considered use of
tests and test scores.
6. 3 EHLR 552: 108 (1980) (memorandum opinion).
7. The Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (1949) [hereinafter referred to
as WISC) is a frequently used individual intelligence test. WISC consists of eleven
subparts which test general comprehension, arithmetic, similarities, vocabulary, digit
span, picture completion, picture arrangement, block design, object assembly.
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. Revised (WISC-R),8 and the Stanford-Binet9 tests had a discrimina
tory impact upon black children within the Chicago school sys
tem. 10 The tests were used by the Chicago school administration as
a means to assist l l them in placing children in classes for the edu
cable mentally handicapped (EMH).12 When two black children
with learning disabilities were misdiagnosed and classified as edu
cable mentally handicapped, PASE alleged violations of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,13 Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,14 the Education of All Handicapped Chil
dren Act of 1975,15 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. 16
Judge John F. Grady, in a detailed opinion,17 examined each
question on the three tests and determined that few of the items
were discriminatory. 18 The judge made this finding by considering

coding, and mazes. See D. WECHSLER, WECHSLER INTELUGENCE SCALE FOR
CHILDREN, MANUAL 9 (1949).
8. The Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised (1972) [hereinafter
referred to as WISC-R] subtests are identical to WISC, except that mazes have been
eliminated and some of the questions have been updated to reflect current education
concepts. See note 39 infra. In addition, the population sample used to standardize
the test has been changed.
9. The Stanford-Binet test attempts to discern whether a child is perfonning at
his age level. If a chilcfs perfonnance is below the mean for his age group he is said
to have a "mental age" below his chronological age. See 3 EHLR at 552:108. The
most recent revision of this test was completed in 1960.
10. P ASE alleged that a statistically significant number of black children were
placed into Educable Mentally Retarded [hereinafter referred to, as EMH] classes
due to poor scores on the standardized tests. P ASE also alleged that the tests were
racially or culturally biased. The use of such tests, therefore, had a discriminatory
impact upon black children. 3 EHLR at 552: 110 n.2.
11. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. § 1404
(1976), which mandates that a standardized test score cannot be the sole criteria for
placement of students into special education classes. See also 3 EHLR at 552:137.
12. See text accompanying notes 56-58 infra.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
15. Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401, was amended by the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(1975). Both versions contain requirements that school districts must meet in order to
obtain federal funding of programs for handicapped children.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1980).
17. The opinion examines all test questions on the WISC, WISC-R, and
Stanford-Binet tests. Judge Grady's opinions about the test questions and the expert
testimony are included in the decision.
18. 3 EHLR 552:108. Judge Grady found one item on the Stanford-Binet test
and eight items on the WISC and WISC-R tests which he believed were culturally
biased against black children or sufficiently suspect to be inappropriate. Id. See also
note 123 infra.
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both parties' expert witness testimony. Judge Grady, independent
of that testimony, determined that the tests were not racially
biased. 19 Without reaching the legal issues of discriminatory impact
or intentional discriminatory treatment, Judge Grady entered judg
ment for defendant. Judge Grady believed that the controversy was
in essence a factual one and that it was unnecessary to reach the
legal issues. Since he did not believe that the tests were racially
biased, plaintiffs were unable to prevail on any of their theories.
The fact that a significantly larger number of black children
were placed into EMH classes provided the judge with undisputed
evidence that the classification program had a disproportionately
greater impact upon the black student population. Courts must
look to the effect of classification programs to determine whether
the scheme used by the school system has an impact that is dispro
portionately greater upon one group than upon others.
Part II of this note presents an overview of testing and school
classification systems. This section examines the various concepts of
intelligence that have been considered in developing standardized
tests, the legal reaction to pupil classification schemes, and the ed
ucation available to children within EMH classes. Part III surveys
the cases that developed the theories of disparate treatment and
disparate impact and then explains when each of these theories
should be applied. The constitutional and statutory theories pre
sented by PASE will be analyzed in part IV of this note. Part V
considers the way Judge Grady framed the question before him
and the way he disposed of the issue.
This note will demonstrate that the courts must go beyond a
lengthy evaluation of specific test items in their attempt to elimi
nate discriminatory placement of children. Plaintiff need not prove
that intentional discrimination has. occurred. When disparate im
pact upon a protected group by any classification scheme is proved,
an injunction should issue against use of that scheme and the
courts should require the school system to develop a nondis
criminatory means of classification.
II.

BACKGROUND

The courts historically have been reluctant to intrude into the
realm of educational policymaking. Courts have felt that educa
19. 3 EHLR at 552:110. Judge Grady chose to disregard certain expert testi
mony relating to the bias of test questions. Instead, he used his personal knowledge
as a basis for ruling on the questions he considered to be suspect. [d. at 552:111. See
also note 123 infra.
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tional policy is the province of educators rather than of jurists.
When educational policy appears to violate the United States Con
stitution or a federal statute,20 however, the courts' reluctance is
overcome by judicial resolve to protect this most important phase
of American life. The United States Supreme Court has spoken of
education as "perhaps the most important function of state and lo
cal govemments."21 Chief Justice Warren, in Brown v. Board of
Education,22 wrote: "[i]n these days it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. "23 Chief Justice Warren's statement is
as true today as it was in 1954.
.
Once a state has established a system of free public education
it must maintain that system in a manner that does not deny its
children their constitutionally protected rights. 24 Any classification
scheme which· places students into discrete groups by virtue of
some characteristic must withstand constitutional scrutiny.25 When
a fundamental right is not at stake26 or when a suspect class is not
involved,27 the court applies a rational relation test. 28 Under this
test the state merely needs to show that the action it has taken is
rationally related to the legitimate goals it hopes to accomplish. 29
20. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (segregated
schools deny students equal protection of the law even though tangible facilities may
be equal); United States v. Sunflower County School Dist., 430 F.2d 839, 841 (5th
Cir. 1970) (use of achievement test scores to assign students was not permissible
when schools were being operated as a dual school system, even though a marked
racial imbalance existed within the school system); United States v. Tunica County
School Dist., 421 F.2d 1236, 1237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 951 (1970) (court
disallowed the use of achievement test scores to reassign pupils to schools after
desegregation was ordered); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist., 419
F.2d 1211, 1216 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971) (dissolution of seg
regated school systems and court order for integrated unitary schools); Spangler v.
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501, 521 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (racial imbalance
among students and faculty, the use of a neighborhood school policy, and a policy
against busing were held to violate the fourteenth amendment and indicated the
need for affirmative integration of the school system).
21. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
22. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23. Id. at 493.
24. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975).
25. Id.
26. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35 (1972) (education
is not considered a fundamental right by the Supreme Court; rather, the provision of
education is legislatively mandated by the states. Id. at 33-38).
27. Id. at 22-28.
28. Id. at 40.
29. Cuyahoga County Ass'n for Retarded Children & Adults v. Essex, 411 F.
Supp. 46, 50 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
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The state is responsible for the development and implementa
tion of an educational system. If a inechanism within that system
classifies students, it will be subject to judicial scrutiny.30 The
Chicago school system categorized students according to scores
achieved on standardized intelligence tests. Instead of looking to
the actual classification system, Judge· Grady only looked to the
tests used by the Chicago schools. Rather than examining the im
pact of the school system's use of the tests on the black student
population, the judge focused upon the form of the tests. When a
classification system is challenged on an equal protection clause ba
sis, as it was in PASE, the courts apply a rational relation test.
When the action of a school system is rationally related to the ends
which it hopes to achieve, the courts are not likely to forbid the ac
tion. Courts support legislative enactments that do not infringe
upon fundamental rights or suspect classes. 31
The following section will expiore the educational and psycho
logical concepts underlying the Chicago school system's classifica
tion scheme. First, students were grouped according to intelli
gence as measured by scores achieved on standardized tests.
Students were then placed into homogeneous groups with students
who achieved similar test scores. The group of students receiving
the lowest scores was placed into a curriculum designed for the ed
ucable mentally handicapped. PASE questioned the validity of the
educational policy underlying the EMH program. Intelligence and
intelligence testing and student tracking are crucial components of
the EMH system.

A.

Intelligence

In the early twentieth century intelligence tests purported to
measure the fixed, innate ability of individuals. 32 The theory un
derlying this concept was that intelligence was purely hereditary:
genes were considered to be determinative of intelligence. 33 This
"genotype" concept of intelligence takes into account only innate
genetic potential. It disregards environmental influences that inter

30. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Justice Powell,
writing for the Court, said that racial and ethnic distinctions of all sorts are inher
ently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination. Id. at 292.
31. 411 U.S. at 40.
32. J. FINCHER, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 185 (1976).
33. See generally J. GUILFORD, THE NATURE OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 349-59
(1967); D. WECHSLER, WECHSLER'S MEASUREMENT AND ApPRAISAL OF ADULT IN
TELLIGENCE (4th ed. 1978).
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act with genes. A number of broad studies have attempted to
prove that genetic factors, rather than environmental factors, con
trol individuals' intelligence. 34 The genetic construct of intelli
gence, however, generally has been rejected. 35 The "phenotype"
construct factors environmental influences into the concept of intel
ligence. Influences upon the fetus during the developmental stages
within the mother's womb as well as external environmental influ
ences upon the child following birth thus are included. 36
Most intelligence tests do not purport to measure either geno
type or phenotype intelligence but to evaluate "ordinary" intelli
gence. 37 These tests simply measure intelligence from the child's
behavior and responses to the test questions and tasks he is asked
to perl'orm. The child is presented with a wide variety of tasks that
are presumed to be an adequate sampling of important intellectual
functions. The child's ability to respond to this sample then is,de
termined to be reflective of hi~ general level of intellectual func
tioning. 38 Intelligence tests normally provide a single score, such
as an intelligence quotient (IQ), which indicates the child's intellec
tual level based upon that specific test. The manual supplied with
the WISC-R states that "the intelligence which [the] test purports
to measure is the overall capacity of an individual to understand
and cope with the world around him. Such capacity is inferred
from the ways ability is manifested. "39
34. See generally J. HUNT, INTELLIGENCE AND EXPERIENCE (1961); INTELLI
GENCE: GENETIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES (R. Cancro, ed. 1971); A.
JENSEN, GENETICS AND EDUCATION (1972); L. KAMIN, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS
OF I.Q. (1974); RACE AND IQ (A. Montagu, ed. 1975); A. SHUEY, THE TESTING OF
NEGRO INTELLIGENCE (1958). These studies do not provide any guidance for the
measurement of innate intelligence. Rather, race or some other genetic determinant
is considered to proscribe the limits of intelligence for the majority of that genetic
type. Geneticists argue that blacks have a lower basis of intelligence due to natural
selection. Although exceptions can be demonstrated, the intelligence curve of blacks
will fall one standard deviation below whites. See Larry P. v. Riles, 3 EHLR 551:295
(1979). It does not appear possible to develop an intelligence test that is culture free
or free from other environmental influences. Thus, measurement of pure genetic in
telligence is impossible.
35. See note 33 supra. See also Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Stand
ardized Ability Tests in Employment and Education, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 691, 692-93
(1968); Note, The Legal Implications of Cultural Bias in the Intelligence Testing of
.Disadvantaged School Children, 61 GEO. L. J. 1027, 1029 n.9 (1973).
36. See note 33 supra.
37. Id.
38. See A. ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 188 (3d ed. 1968).
39. WISC-R Manual, 5 (1974). Ten categories of ability are measured by the
WISC-R: General information, general comprehension, arithmetic, similarities, vo
cabulary, picture completion, block design, object assembly, and coding. Id. at 8.
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A child's intelligence may be measured accurately through the
use of standardized tests only if the testing instrument is standard
ized upon a large, representative sample of children. If such stand
ardization does not occur, the test cannot be considered a valid in
dicator of intellectual functioning. 4o Intelligence tests generally,
and the Stanford-Binet and Wechsler Scales specifically, have been
standardized through national samples of school children. 41
Validation studies42 demonstrate that the test measures what it
purports to measure. When validation studies are complete, a test
that is valid for the purpose it was designed to achieve· may be
used solely to examine that for which it was validated. 43 The three
tests litigated in PASE were not validated for the purpose of
placing students into specific classifications within the Chicago
schools.
40. The standardization sample used by Wechsler for the WISC-R included 200
children in each of 11 age groups, or a total of 2,200 school children ranging in age
from six and one half years to 16¥.! years. One hundred boys and 100 girls were in
cluded at each age level. The racial percentages were 85% white and 15% nonwhite.
The nonwhite category included Black, Chicano, Puerto Rican, Oriental, and Ameri
can Indian children. The standardization sample used by Wechsler accurately re
flected urban and rural populations and the occupational group of the head of house
hold. The occupational groups used included: (1) Professional/technical; (2)
managers, officials, proprietors, clerical, and sales; (3) craftsmen and foremen; (4) op
eratives, service workers, farmers, and farm managers; (5) laborers, farm laborers,
farm foremen.
The original WISC did not categorize by race within its standardization sample.
The occupational base was for the father of the children sampled rather than for the
head of household as on the WISC-R. Like the newer version, the original did not
include children from homes of the unemployed within its standardization sample.
D. WECHSLER, WECHSLER INTELLIGENCE SCALE FOR ClDLDREN, MANUAL 7-9,
(1949). See also note 130 infra.
41. See note 40 supra.
42. There are three methods by which to validate a test: Criterion validity,
which correlates scores achieved on tests with ability to cope with the world; con
struct validity, which identifies the psychological trait that underlies successful
performance; and content validity, which representatively samples significant parts
of what the child has learned. See generally A. ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTlNG,
100-119 (3d ed. 1961). Validation studies determine how a test may be used. See, e.g.
Larry P. v. Riles, 3 EHLR at 551:324. For example, a test validated as an indicator of
students' school achievement must not be used as an indicator of students' intelli
gence. Similarly, the results of such an achievement test administered to school chil
dren must not be used to determine the capability of the teacher. See also 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.35(b)(I) (1980); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.532(a)(2) (1980).
43. It is interesting to note that the authors of the tests and those who develop
the standardization samples have a preconceived notion that males' and females'
scores will not vary because of sex while it is noted that scores of whites and
nonwhites vary an average of 15 points, or one standard deviation, from the mean. In
fact, the Stanford-Binet was modified at one time because the test yielded different
scores for boys and girls and the test makers felt that such differences were
unacceptable. See 3 EHLR at 551:314.
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Classification or Tracking of Students

In public schools standardized tests are used primarily to place
students into homogeneous classmcations44 or "tracks." "Tracking"
has become a widely accepted educational practice. 45 Academic
ability is a relevant criterion for the placement of students simply
due to the academic differences between students. 46 The equal
treatment required by the equal protection clause does not pro
hibit the state or its schools from distinguishing among its citi
zens. 47
Hobson v. Hanson 48 involved the impact of tracking on minor
ity pupils. The track system consisted of four levels designed to
meet the individual differences among students in the Washington,
D. C. school system. The four levels included the intellectually
gifted, the above average, the average, and the retarded. Each
level of students was assigned to a self-contained curriculum. 49 The
"special" track for retarded students provided limited, basic in
struction.
The court found that the track system deprived blacks and
poor pupils of the right to an education equal to that afforded to af
fluent students. The court dissolved the track system, basing its
44. The United States Supreme Court noted in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89
(1965) that "mere classification ... does not of itself deprive a group of equal protec
tion." [d. at 92. Although Carrington involved a fundamental right, the case is in
structive because the Court allowed states to impose reasonable requirements but
not to deny citizens of equal protection merely because of a particular classification.
45. See generally Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D. D.C. 1967), cen. dis
missed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968).
46. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 511-13 (D.D.C. 1967).
47. [d. at 511.
48. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D. D.C. 1967). This case involved the placement of black
children into the lowest tracks in the Washington, D.C. school system. Judge
Wright's lIB-page opinion is recognized as the landmark case about school tracking
systems. The track system as administered by the Washington, D.C. schools grouped
students according to socio-economic and racial status rather than intellectual ability.
Many black children were deprived of an education equal to that afforded more af
fluent students. The tracking system was not flexible; students who entered the
lowest tracks rarely were able to move into the higher tracks. Judge Wright held that
the track system voided any rationality that might exist in homogeneous grouping.
He ordered the track system abolished because it discriminated against the disadvan
taged child, particularly the black child.
49. Three tracks were provided for students within the elementary schools:
"Basic," or "special academic," for retarded children; "general" for average and
above average children; and "honors" for gifted pupils. At the high school level the
"regular" track was added to allow the above average student to be prepared for
college. For a full explanation of the track system as used in the Washington, D.C.
schools at the time of this litigation, see 269 F. Supp. at 442-50.
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decision on the large number of blacks in this "special" track as
compared with the number of blacks in other, higher tracks. Sev
eral other factors also persuaded Judge Wright to enjoin the track
system: The lack of movement among tracks in spite of the pur
ported flexibility of the system;50 the failure of the schools to pro
vide remedial programs for retarded and emotionally handicapped
children;51 and the use of standardized tests found to be culturally
and racially biased. 52 The court held that the deprivation of equal
educational opportunity violated both the equal protection and due
process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 53 Judge Wright,
however, expressed the opinion that ability grouping could be rea
sonably related to the purpose of public education and that differ
ential treatment is not offensive per se. Although courts tradi
tionally have avoided determinations of educational policy, they
have become active when such policies foster educational practices
resulting in disparate classification by race. 54
The Chicago schools use standardized test scores to place stu
dents into homogeneous tracks. Unlike Judge Wright, Judge Grady
examined only the tests, disregarding other factors that might have
warranted dissolution of the track system. He did not discuss the
lack of student movement among the tracks or the nonexistence of
remedial programs. Most importantly, he gave little weight to the
disproportionate number of black children placed in the EMH
track. 55
C.

Educable Mentally Handicapped

The Illinois school code mandates special classes for the educa
ble mentally handicapped. 56 The curriculum for the EMH students

50. 269 F. Supp. at 445, 464.
51. Id. at 468, 469-73.
52. [d. at 476-85.
53. Id. at 511-12.
54. See, e.g., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (separate but equal is inherently unequal);
Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., 330 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. La. 1971), affd,
456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1013 (1972) (assigning black
children into homogeneous groups in recently desegregated school on basis of stand
ardized ability and achievement tests violated the childrens' fourteenth amendment
right to be treated equally, especially when blacks recently had been educated in in
ferior schools). See notes 60 and 61 infra and accompanying text for discussion of
disparate impact and disparate treatment theories.
55. 3 EHLR at 552:109.
56. Educable Mentally Handicapped is defined as:
[C)hildren between the ages of 3 and 21 years who because of retarded in
tellectual development as determined by individual psychological evalua
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is designed for children who are unable to benefit from the pro
gram of instruction offered in the regular classroom. Material is
presented to these handicapped children at a slower pace than in
the normal classroom. Emphasis is placed on teaching the skills
that are necessary for independent living. The subject matter is
oriented toward socialization, language skills, and vocational train
ing. Academic subjects are taught on an elementary level with the
objective of helping the child become economically independent. 57
The label "mentally retarded" will remain with the child as a
part of his permanent school record. A child placed into a class for
the mentally handicapped usually will not be transferred to a regu
lar class. Children who graduate from EMH programs in the
Chicago school system are awarded special diplomas that do not
qualify them to go on to college. 58 A child who is placed errone
ously into such a program thus is deprived of the benefits that oth
erwise would have been available to him during his school years.
The child also is deprived of those opportunities normally available
after graduation.

III.

ROLE OF THE COURTS IN EDUCATIONAL TESTING

Equal educational opportunity cases are brought under legal
theories that originate in the equal employment field, specifically
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 59 The two primary theo
ries of discrimination created by title VII are disparate treatments°
and disparate impact. 61 Disparate treatment occurs when similarly
situated individuals or classes are treated differently because of

tion are incapable of being educated profitably and effectively through ordi
nary classroom instruction but who may be expected to benefit from special
education facilities designed to make them economically useful and socially
adjusted.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-1.04 (1977) (repealed 1979). "[S]pecial Education
means specially designed instruction . . . to meet the unique needs . . . [of
handicapped children]." 45 C.F.R. § 121a.14 (1980). Mentally retarded children are
included among the handicapped. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (1980). Classes for mentally
handicapped children are appropriate when the children have "significant sub
average general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adap
tive behavior and manifested during the developmental period, which adversely af
fects a child's educational performance." 45 C.F.R. § 121a.5(b)(4) (1980).
57. Larry P. v. Riles,3 EHLR 551:295 (1979).
58. 3 EHLR 552:109.
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1970).
60. See Martin v. Chrysler Corp., 10 FEP 329 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Slack v. Ha
vens, 7 FEP 885 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
61. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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race. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green 62 held that a prima facie
case of disparate treatment is shown when: The plaintiff is a mem
ber of a racial minority; he applied for a job; he had the requisite
qualifications; he was denied employment; and the job remained
open after his application was rejected. 63 The burden of proof then
shifts to the defendant employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory
reason for denying the plaintiff employment. 64 The plaintiff then
must demonstrate that the employer's explanation was merely a
pretext and that it was the employer's intent to preclude a minor
ity from employment. Plaintiff will lose unless he proves that the
employer's nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext. 65 Proof of in
tent to discriminate, therefore, is crucial to a disparate treatment
claim. 66
The theory of disparate impact, as articulated by the United.
States Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 67 is the sec
ond ground for suit under title VII. Establishing a prima facie case
of discriminatory impact, however, requires more proof than is
needed under the disparate treatment theory. Plaintiffs usually use
statistical evidence to establish a prima facie case. 68 A showing that
a protected class 69 suffers from a statistically significant discrimina
tory impact is sufficient to establish the prima facie case. It is very
difficult to establish a clear showing of· disparate impact. Such a
showing may be disputed through use of a differing range of statis
tics which indicates no significant impact. 7o If, however, the plain
tiff is able to establish a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to
the defendant to prove that the act which resulted in disparate im
pact was based upon a husiness necessity or was job related. 71
Washington v. Davis 7 'l. involved the validity of a standardized

62. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
63. Id. at 802.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 804.
66. Id. at 805.
67. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See also Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975); Larry P. v. Riles, 3 EHLR 551:295 (1979).
68. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 428-36 (1975). See also
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Keyes v. School Dist.
No. One, 413 U.S. 189 (1972).
69. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
70. For an extended look at the use of statistical evidence by both parties, see
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
71. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
72. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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test73 used to predict candidates' potential for success as police offi
cers in Washington, D.C. The test allegedly excluded a dispropor
tionately large number of black applicants and was challenged as a
discriminatory device violative of the fifth amendment7 4 and of 42
U.S.C. § 1981. 75 The Court resolved Davis under a constitutional
theory of equal protection and held that the fourteenth amendment
required plaintiffs to prove defendant's intent to discriminate; a
showing of discriminatory impact was inadequate. 76
Plaintiffs were able to demonstrate disproportionate impact,
but this showing was insufficient to sustain plaintiffs' cause of action
because the case originally was brought under a constitutional
theory, not under title VII. The Court explained that the strict
scrutiny test normally applied in racial classification cases is not
invoked when mere discriminatory impact is shown. Rather, inten
tional or purposeful discriminatory treatment triggers the strict
scrutiny test. 77 "Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is
not the sole touchstone of invidious racial discrimination forbidden
by the Constitution. "78 The Constitution did not require the Court
to infer discrimination from disparate impact. To uphold the Davis
testing scheme, therefore, the Court merely needed to find a ra
tional relation between the test and the ends it purported to
achieve. "The test is neutral on its face and rationally may be said
to serve a purpose the government is Constitutionally empowered
to pursue. "79
The Supreme Court in Davis said, however, that when title
73. Test 21 was used by the District of Columbia as an objective measurement
standard for police recruits. The test was validated to show likelihood of success at
the police academy; it was not validated to show the candidate's chance of success as
a police officer. ld. at 235.
74. "[Tlhe Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal pro
tection component prohibiting the United States from invidiously discriminating be
tween individuals or groups." Id. at 239.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides in part, "All persons within the jurisdic
tion of the United States shall have the same right in every state and territory ... to
the full and equal benefit of all laws ... as enjoyed by white citizens...."
76. 426 U.S. at 238-39. In a concurring opinion in Davis, Justice Stevens con
ceded that:
[flrequently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective evi
dence of what actually happened rather than evidence describing the sub
jective state of mind of the actor. For normally the actor is presumed to have
intended the natural consequences of his deeds. This is particularly true in
the case of governmental action which is frequently the product of compro
mise, of collective decision making and of mixed motivation.
Id. at 253.
77. Id. at 242.

78. Id.
79. Id. at 246.
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VII is applicable and when disproportionate impact is demon
strated by the plaintiff, it is not enough for the defendant employer
to show a rational basis for the challenged practice; he also must
validate80 the practice. 81 The Court thus has shifted the burden of
proof in title VII cases from the plaintiff who demonstrates dispro
portionate impact to the defendant employer who must validate the
test against an acceptable standard. 82
In Larry P. v. Riles, 83 the district court invalidated California's
system of classifying black children for Educable Mentally Re
tarded (EMR)84 classes. The court held that the use of standardized
intelligence tests 85 that are racially and culturally biased and that
have not been validated86 for the purpose of placing children into
EMR classes violated the California Constitution, the United States
Constitution, and United States statutes. 87 The court, in an ex
haustive analysis of standardized testing, cultural bias, test adminis
tration procedures, and EMR placement, permanently enjoined
the State of California from using standardized tests to place chil
dren permanently into EMR classes. 88 Plaintiffs in PASE relied
strongly on Larry P. because the cases shared similar facts.

IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF
EDUCATIONAL TESTING

PASE embodies constitutional as well as statutory issues. This
section will explore the constitutional questions that arise under
80. See note 42 supra.
81. 426 U.S. at 246-47.
82. Acceptable standards include: Job relatedness, achievement, proficiency,
and academic success. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations re
quire that the "validity of a job qualification test be proven by empirical data
demonstrating that the test is predictive or significantly correlated with important el
ements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which
candidates are being evaluated." Id. at 264 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 29
C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1975».
83. 3 EHLR at 551:295.
84. Educable mentally retarded is synonymous with educable mentally
handicapped and is simply the designation used in California.
85. The same three intelligence tests used by the Chicago school system were
used in the California system. They are discussed throughout Larry P.
86. See note 42 supra.
87. 3 EHLR at 551:336. Larry P. challenged the California schools under the
fourteenth amendment equal protection clause, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
29 U.S.c. § 794 (1970), the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §
1401 (1970), Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1970), and the
Equal Educational Opportunity Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1976).
88. Larry P. is a 125-page opinion discussing each of these areas. The district
court concluded that the California school system was discriminating on the basis of
race. 3 EHLR at 551:339.
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equal protection clause claims and then will examine the issues
that arise under the various federal statutes.
As noted in Davis, plaintiffs' equal protection claim will suc
ceed only if they can prove intent to discriminate. A demonstration
of discriminatory impact is insufficient. To develop a cause of ac
tion under the fourteenth amendment in education cases, a plaintiff
must prove that the defendant school board intended to create and
us.e a racial classification. 89 PASE apparently was able to demon
strate· a racially discriminatory impact by showing that eighty-two
percent of the students ip EMH classes were black while only
sixty-two percent of the school population was black. 90 Judge Gra
dy'sopinion indicates that PASE had no evidence that the school
intended to use these standardized tests for a discriminatory pur
pose. ILthe plaintiff fails to prove intent or if the defendant ade
qua,tely rebuts the. proof,' the court then is required to evaluate the
classification on the basis of a rational relation test.
The constitutionality of classifications based on standardized
test scores also is judged by a rational relation test. 91 The classifica
tion method must be rationally related to the goals to be achieved.
To invalidate a classification scheme under the rational relation
test, plaintiff must show that the classification is arbitrary, that it
does not have a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, or that the legislation is not supported by a legitImate
state interest. 92 When the constitutionality of a state-imposed dlS
sification system based upon intelligence is at issue, equal protec
tion analysis focuses upon whether the method of classification
promotes legitimate state interests. 93
A rational relation is easy to demonstrate in these situations.
"[E]ducators almost universally favor ability grouping of stu
dents. "94 Testing devices are used to discover special learning
problems. If such problems exist and are not discovered, the child
may lose his ability to cope within the regular classroom. He may

89. United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.C.S.C. 1977), aII'd
sub nom. National Educ. Ass'n v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978).
90. 3 EHLR at 552:109.
91. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); United States v. South Carolina,
445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.C.S.C. 1977); Cuyahoga County Ass'n for Retarded Children &
Adults v. Essex, 411 F. Supp. 46 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
92. Cuyahoga County Ass'n for Retarded Children & Adults v. Essex, 411 F.
Supp. 46, 50 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
93. See Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEXAS L.
REV. 411 (1973); J. Coleman, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966).,
94. YudofI, supra note 93, at 425.
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be ridiculed by his peers and feel that he is a failure.
constitutionality of testing programs to be judged by a
tion .standard places an insurmountable burden on
Proving a violation of a child's cpnstitutional rights is
possible under the rational relation test.
A.
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Allowing the
rational rela
the plaintiff.
virtually im

Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974

The Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 197495 requires the
plaintiff to prove intent to discriminate. The Act itself reads: "no
State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on
account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin by
[a.] the deliberate segregation by an educational agency of students
on the basis of race, color or national origin among or within
schools ..... "96 The requirement of deliberate segregation demon
strates that the intent to segregate must be proven in order for the
plaintiff to succeed under this Act. The recent district court case of
Otero v. Mesa County Valley School District 97 held that the Act
will not permit recovery when discriminatory impact has been es
'tablished but when intent to discriminate has not.
, Segregation of students on one of the bases noted in the stat
ute would result in discrimination, thus deliberate segregation may
be read as deliberate discrimination. Though the Equal Educa
tional Opportunity Act does not specify the standard of scrutiny by
which infractions will be judged, the stated intent requirement
points to a mere rational relation test.
. The' intent requirement of the Equal Educational Opportunity
Act of 1974 would require PASE to prove that the school system
intended the classification to operate on a racial basis. The intent
standard again would foreclose PASE from successfully suing under
the A~t.
B.

Title Vi of the Civil Rights Act as Amended
The issues involved in title VII cases are paralleled in title VI
suits. 98 Title VI provides that: "[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origins be excluded

95. 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1976).
96: 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1976) (emphasis added).
97. 470 F. Supp. 326 (D.C. Colo. 1979).
98. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Serna v. Portales School Dist., 499
F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974); Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 386 F.
Supp. 539 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
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from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal fi
nancial assistance. "99
The purpose of the legislation was to protect, and provide ef
fective means to enforce, the civil rights of persons within the ju
risdiction of the United States. lOO Two of the legislation's objectives
were to authorize the attorney general to initiate suits to deseg
regate public schools lol and to prohibit discrimination in any finan
cial assistance program. 102 The Code of Federal Regulations states:
[a] recipient . . . [of federal aid], . . . may not . . . utilize
criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of
subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race,
color or national origin or have the effect of defeating or sub
stantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the pro
gram as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national
origin. loa

The Board of Education of the City of Chicago has received fi
nancial assistance from the federal government and therefore is le
gally required to comply with title VI. Since title VI applies to all
aspects of the educational program,104 Chicago's EMH program
must comply or the city will lose federal financial assistance.
Defendant school board argued that a title VI challenge could
not succeed without proof of intent to discriminate. Nothing in the
languag~ of title VI, however, requires proof of intent. The words
"have the effect" merely imply that defendant's criteria resulted in
a discribinatory impact.
Other civil rights statutes that reject an intent requirement
should be influe.ntial in the interpretation of title VI. Cases inter
preting title VII have held that even an unintended impact consti
tutes a violation. lOS Title VIII, regarding housing equality, also
does not require a showing of intent to discriminate. Instead, it
proscribes housing practices with racially segregative conse

99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1976).
100. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1964, reprinted in [1964] U.S.
CODE CONG & An. NEWS 2391, 2391.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1980) (emphasis added).
104. Board of Pub. Instruction of Taylor County v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th
Cir. 1969).
105. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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quences. 106 Under both titles VII and VIII, proof of racial disparity
constitutes a prima facie case. 107
Plaintiffs in PASE showed that eighty-two percent of the stu
dents in EMH classes in Chicago were black and that sixty-two
percent of the school population was black. los Plaintiffs established
a prima facie case of racial discrimination by demonstrating that
this disproportionate impact was caused by standardized tests not
validated for EMH placement. When the plaintiff presents un
disputed statistical evidence that a disproportionately large number
of black students were placed in EMH classes, he has met his ini
tial burden to make a prima facie showing. The burden of proof
then shifts to the defendant to rebut this prima facie showing
by demonstrating a substantial justification for the challenged
policy. 100
Lau v. Nichols,llo which involved challenges under the Con
stitution and title VI, illustrates the mechanics of title VI. Plaintiffs
sued the San Francisco school district to protest its refusal to pro
vide bilingual education for Chinese students who did not speak
English. Plaintiffs presented no proof of intent to discriminate. 111
The Court held that title VI prohibits discrimination "even though
no purposeful design is present. . . . "112 The disproportionate
placement of black children into EMH classes in Chicago similarly
penalizes black children. Like the children in Lau, they are de
prived of a meaningful education.
Lora v. Board of Education of New York 113 is similar in many
106. Metropolitan HollS. Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564
F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Whitman Area Improvement Council
v. Resident Bd., 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
107. See notes 105 and 106 supra.
108. 3 EHLR at 552:108.
109. 411 U.S. at 802.
110. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
111. ld. at 569 (Stewart, J., with Burger, C.J., & Blackmun, J., concurring).
112. ld. at 568.
113. 456 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated, 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980).
The City of New York appealed and the Second Circuit vacated the district court
judgment, concluding that intent, not mere impact, was necessary in a title VI claim.
Id. at 250. The Second Circuit relied upon Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130
(1979), but the Supreme Court in Harris expressly reserved opinion on the appropri
ate standard in title VI cases. id. at 149. See also HEW Regulations designed to im
plement title VI, 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(I)-(3) (1980). A number of federal court cases
also have held that a mere impact standard is appropriate under title VI, e.g. Lau v.
Nichols, 414 U.S. at 568; Board of Educ. v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1978),
afI'd. on other grounds sub nom. Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979).
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respects to PASE. The Federal District Court for the Eastern Dis
trict of New York applied a discriminatory impact standard to
claims brought by black children challenging placement into special
day schools. Plaintiff argued that the tests were racially biased and
that they were overemphasized as indicators of student ability. The
defense claimed that the tests were merely a portion of a total eval
uation process and that the diagnosticians were told to consider
the "socio-economic pluralism" of the students. 114 The district court
found a violation of title VI because plaintiff showed that defen
dant's conduct had a racially discriminatory effect. No intent to dis
criminate was needed. 115 .
As noted 'in Larry 'P., once the prima facie showing of dis
parate impact has been made, the defendant may rebut by show
ing that disproportionate enrollment in EMH classes actually re
flects a greater incidence of mental retardation among black chil
dren. 11s In addition, if the defendants are able to show that the
tests have been validated for the placement of black children into
EMH classes, the tests then may be used in spite of their dispro
portionate impact.
C.

Handicapped Persons and Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973117 was designed
to eliminate discrimination on the basis of handicap in any program
or activity receiving federal financial assi~tance.118 A handicapped
person is defined as "any person who (i) has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activi
ties, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as
having such an impairment. "119
The Chicago schools receive money through federal assistance
programs and thus are required to comply with section 504. Cer
tain regulations implementing section 504120 deal specifically with
114. 456 F. Supp, at 1243, People from varying cultural, social, or economic
backgrounds are different; each pupil must be considered with his unique qualities
in mind,
115, Id. at 1277. "A prima facie violation of Title VI would be established if it
were shown that referrals and policies [and) practices, , , which have a racially dis
criminatory effect as evidenced by the overrepresentation of minority students in
these schools," Id.
116, 3 EHLR at 551:322,
117, Pub, L. 93-112, 87 STAT, 355, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), as amended by Pub.
L. 95-602, 92 STAT. 2982, 29 U,S.C. § 794 (1978),
118, 45 C.F.R. § 84,1 (1980),
119. 45 C.F.R. § 84,30) (1980),
120, 45 C,F.R. § 84,34 (1980),
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evaluation and placement121 of handicapped students. The regula
tions specifY criteria for evaluation procedures such as those for
standardized tests:
[a] recipient to which this subpart applies [public schools] shall
establish standards and procedures for the evaluation and place
ment of persons who, because of handicap, need ... special ed
ucation or related services which ensure that:
1. Tests . . . have been validated for the specific purpose for
which they are used ... ;
2. Tests and other evaluation material include those tailored to
assess specific areas of educational need and are not merely
those which are designed to provide a single general intelligence
quotient. 122

Neither the Stanford-Binet nor the Wechsler Scales have been vali
dated for the purpose of classifYing students into EMH classes.
These tests have not not been tailored to. assess specific areas of
educational need but are designed to provide a general intelligence
quotient. The Chicago school system's use of these tests, therefore,
appears to violate section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Their use
for the placement of handicapped children should be discontinued
on that basis alone.
V. PASE
Judge John F. Grady, author of the PASE opInIOn, did not
deal with any of the preceding legal theories or statutes. Instead,
Judge Grady evaluated the individual test questions and concluded
that eight questions on the WISC and WISC-R tests and one ques
tion on the Stanford-Binet test were culturally biased. 123 The judge
used his own criteria to determine whether the questions were
biased. Judge Grady, who believed that the expert testimony re
garding bias was not conclusive, chose to disregard the testimony
of the expert witnesses presented by the parties. 124
121. 45 C.F.R. § 84.35 (1980).
122. 45 C.F.R. § 84.35(b)(I), (b)(2) (1978).
123. 3 -EHLR at 552: 135. Judge Grady found the following questions to be ra
cially biased: (1) What is the color of rubies?; (2) What does C.O.D. mean?; (3) Why
is it better to pay bills by check than by cash?; (4) What would you do if you were
sent to the store to buy a loaf of bread and the grocer said he didn't have any more?;
(5) What does a stomach do?; (6) Why is it generally better to give money to an or
ganized charity than to a street beggar?; (7) What are you supposed to do if you find
someone's wallet or pocketbook in a store?; (8) What is the thing to do if a boy (girl)
much smaller than yourself starts a fight with you? Id.
On the Stanford-Binet test, the one item which Judge Grady found to be biased
was a question asking the four-and-one-half-year-old child to identify which of two
persons, shown on cards, was prettier. Id.
124. Judge Grady cited Federal Rule of Evidence 702 regarding expert
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Plaintiff's experts had participated in Larry P., 125 which had
been decided for plaintiff less than one year earlier. Plaintiff's
counsel did not anticipate the judge's approach so they did not pre
pare their expert witnesses by reviewing each of the specific test
items. Thus, the witnesses were unprepared to respond adequately
to Judge Grady when he asked them about individual test ques
tions.l 26 Individual test questions were not examined in Larry P.
because Judge Peckham of the California District Court did not
find it necessary, choosing instead to deal with the legal issues. 127
Judge Peckham stated that the cultural bias of the tests was "hardly
disputed in this litigation. "128
Experts within the fields of education, psychology, and psy
chological testing have stated that the WISC and Stanford-Binet in
telligence tests are culturally biased against blacks.. Dr. David
Wechsler conceded that the WISC was developed for an all-white
population and that no attempts were made to validate the test for
use by the black population. 129 The WISC-R was restandardized in
1972 to include a fifteen percent nonwhite population, but this
restandardization was not an attemp~ to validate test items for mi
norities. 130 In Larry P. the court noted that black children raised
in a cultural environment closer to the white middle-class main
stream tend to perform better on the tests and that early interven
tion· programs such as Head Start improve test scores of black chil
dren. 13l In addition, it has been said that, "Each culture fosters
and encourages the development of behavior that is adapted to its
values and demands. When an individual must adjust to and com
pete within a culture or sub-culture other than that in which he

witnesses. He stated that expert testimony is not conclusive. Rather, it is to help
factfinders to understand complicated material. 3 EHLR at 552:110 n.3.
125. 3 EHLR at 551:295.
126. 3 EHLR at 552:111.
127. 3 EHLR at 551:318.
128. [d. at 551:317.
129. D. WECHSLER, MEASUREMENT OF INTELLIGENCE 107 (1944).
130. See note 40 supra and accompanying text regarding the standardization
sample used in the WISC-R. The standardization sample for the Stanford-Binet in
1916 was on an all-white population of 1000 children and 400 adults. The 1937 revi
sion of the standardization used 3000 all-white schoolchildren. No new standardiza
tion was made for the 1960 revision. In 1972 a new population sample was drawn
from locales in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Texas, and Utah. There
probably were some black children tested within these locales but only to the extent
of the proportion of blacks actually living within the test school districts. No identifi
cation by race was made by the examiners. 3 EHLR at 551:316 n.64.
131. 3 EHLR at 551:316.
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was reared, then cultural difference is likely to become cultural
disadvantage. "132
Federal law prohibits the use of tests that result in racial
imbalance within classification schemes. 133 One prior district court
decision found the use of the WISC, WISC-R, and Stanford-Binet
tests to have a disparate impact upon black children in EMH
placement.1 34 Rather than consider Larry P. as precedent, Judge
Grady chose to review the individual test items and to disregard
the legal issues raised by PASE. If Judge Grady had considered
the issues and examined each one separately, PASE would have
succeeded on some of its theories but would have failed on others.
The claim that PASE brought under the fourteenth amend
ment's equal protection clause could not have succeeded. It is un
likely that such a claim would survive under a rational relation test.
In PASE, the court undoubtedly would have found the school's use
of these standardized tests to be rationally related to the ability
grouping of students: A legitimate state goal. Similarly, the Equal
Educational Opportunity Act claim would fail because the statute
expressly requires intent, and Otero considered intent vital to a
cause of action under the Act. 13S
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the Education of All
Handicapped Children Act 136 are funding statutes. Section 504
prohibits discrimination against handicapped persons by programs
receiving federal funding. Title VI prohibits racial discrimination in
the administration of 'educational programs receiving federal fund
ing. The Education of All Handicapped Children Act conditions re
ceipt of federal funds on the use of tests and evaluation procedures
which are neither racially nor culturally discriminatory. A finding
for plaintiff based upon anyone of these statutes should have been
sufficient to warrant an injunction against use of the tests by the
Chicago school system.
A disproportionate impact theory should be used to prove a vi
olation of each of these funding statutes. Discriminatory impact was
shown in PASE: eighty-two percent of the EMH population was
132. A. ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 241 (3d ed. 1970).
133. See note 119 supra and accompanying text.
134. Larry P. specifically considered the three tests which were at issue in
PASE. 3 EHLR at 551:295.
135. 470 F. Supp. at 331 (reference is made to 20 U.S.C. § 1703). See also text
accompanying note 82 supra.
136. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(c) (1976).
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black while only sixty-two percent of the school population was
black. This was sufficient to prove a prima facie case of race dis
crimination and to place the burden of proof upon the defense to
demonstrate a substantial justification for the use of its testing cri
teria in the placement of students into EMH classes.
The three standardized tests discussed in Judge Grady's opin
ion may be fair in form. The tests consist of many sections and lev
els of competence and cover a wide variety of areas. After a thor
ough analysis of each question he found a total of nine biased
questions. Yet a disproportionately large number of black children
score poorly on the tests and, as a result of those scores, are placed
into EMH classes. 137 If the questions themselves are not biased,
some other portion of the placement procedure must affect black
children adversely. Perhaps the high proportion of black children
in EMH· classes does accurately reflect the fact that there is a
higher percentage of mentally handicapped black children in the
Chicago schools. If some other portion of the placement procedure
is causing the disproportionate impact, however, section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act is being violated. Section 504 states that "[nlo
otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by rea
son of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination . . . . "138
The two children with learning disabilities represented by PASE
were placed into EMH classes. Whether the placement was based
upon poor test scores or on some other facet of the evaluative pro
cess, these two otherwise qualified pupils were, by reason of
their handicap, excluded from participation in the regular school
curriculum.
If the disproportion of blacks in EMH classes in Chicago is
caused by natural forces, then the theories of intelligence discussed
earlier need to be reevaluated. 139 If EMH classes were directed to
ward students with deficiencies in phenotype or ordinary intelli
gence, the educators would continuously evaluate the students and
upgrade their expectations of the students because both theories of
intelligence recognize that scores on intelligence tests can be im
proved. 140 By providing greater stimulation within the pupil's envi
137. 3 EHLR at 552: 138. The testimony of experts shows that the largest corre
lation between the placement program employed by the Chicago schools and the
children actually placed into EMH classes is low test scores. Id.
138. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1978).
139. See notes 32-38 supra and accompanying text.
140. See note 56 supra.
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ronment and by teaching the pupil to cope effectively with the
world around him, intelligence quotients, as measured by these
tests, can be improved. 141 If children are placed into EMH classes
based upon phenotype or ordinary intelligence, they should be
able to improve their scores and return to the regular classroom.
This would require a program of compensatory or remedial group
ing142 rather than continuous grouping,143 the system used in
Chicago's EMH program.
Judge Grady did not consider genetic intelligence to he an
acceptable concept. 144 Purely genetic considerations of intelligence
do not seem reasonable. The use of continuous grouping where
neither the tests nor other evaluative material are considered
biased leads, however, to the conclusion that the poor snowing by
blacks in the Chicago schools can be attributed to the existence of
a larger percentage of mentally handicapped blacks. Although this
conclusion seems neither realistic nor reasonable, it, exists as one
explanation for the significant diffzrence in the percentage of blacks
in Chicago's EMH classes as compared with the general school
population in Chicago.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The curriculum of the EMH program in the Chicago schools is
inferior to that provided within the normal classroom. The suit
brought by PASE requested an injunction against the Chicago
schools to prevent the continued use of standardized tests as a tool
for placing students into EMH classes. Low scores on standardized
tests were the sole constant factor found for all children in the
EMH program although the tests are only a portion of the place
ment process. Eighty-two percent of the EMH classes are black
while only sixty-two percent of the school population is black. This
allows a plaintiff to allege that the EMH placement process has' a
disproportionate impact upon the bla9k population. Under a theory
of disparate impact, PASE could have, developed
prima facie
showing of discrimination thereby shifting the burden to defendant
to rebut such showing.
,
'
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 504 of the Re

a

141. See note 48 and text accompanying notes' 50-54 supra.
142. See notes 32-38 supra and accompanying text. Remedial grouping antic
ipates movement from lower to higher tracks through improvement in test scores.
143. Continuous grouping ,does not anticipate movement of-students' to higher
tracks nor does it anticipate improvement in 'test scores.
'
' ,
144. 3 EHLR at '552:136.
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habilitation Act, and the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act all appear to have been violated by the Chicago schools. The
"fair in form"145 evaluation applied by the court to the tests short
circuits the legal questions. Each of the legal issues that were elim
inated by Judge Grady's factual analysis are those which deal with
federal fipancing. Although plaintiff sought merely declaratory and
injunctive relief, it is likely that federal educational funds would
have been affected by a decision adverse to the city schools. Judge
Grady's decision, based upon the bias in individual test questions,
prevented the interruption of federal funding to the Chicago school
system.
The question that must be answered, and that should have
been answered in PASE, is not whether these tests are racially
biased but whether the test results have a discriminatory impact
upon a protected population. To answer this question a court must
consider statistical evidence presented by both parties, rather than
examine individual test questions for racial or cultural bias.

Peter C. Sipperly
145. 401 U.S. at 431 (1971). Chief Justice Burger, while 'addressing the impact
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on employment, stated that, "[tlhe Act proscribes not
only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in
operation." Id.

